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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 In his opening brief, Martin Ambriz argued the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress because the officers who stopped his vehicle lacked reasonable 
suspicion to believe he was driving under the influence or had committed a traffic 
offense.  In its brief, the State misstates the testimony regarding Mr. Ambriz’s driving 
and argues, for the first time, that Mr. Ambriz committed two traffic violations.  The 
record reflects that Mr. Ambriz’s driving was well within the broad range of what can be 
described as normal, and the State did not argue or prove in the district court that he 
committed a traffic violation.  The officers who stopped Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle did not 
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress.   
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Ambriz included a statement of the facts and course of proceedings in his 
opening brief, which he incorporates herein by reference.  (App. Br., pp.1-4.)  He 
includes this section here only to respond to the State’s description of his driving.  The 
State asserts in its brief that when Mr. Ambriz turned from Hillcrest onto East 16th 
Street, “both of his passenger side tires went off the roadway and onto the gravel on the 
side of the road.”  (Resp. Br., p.1.)  The State asserts “Deputy Zalewski testified that 
when [Mr.] Ambriz’s vehicle made a right turn, both of his right tires fully went off the 
roadway and onto the gravel.”  (Resp. Br., p.1.)  The State later asserts “[t]he deputies 
observed both of [Mr.] Ambriz’s passenger side tires completely leave the roadway.”  
(Resp. Br., p.5.)  These statements are not accurate. 
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Deputy Zalewski never testified that both of Mr. Ambriz’s passenger side tires 
went off the roadway into the gravel when he turned onto East 16th Street.  She testified 
on direct examination as follows: 
Q: And did you observe anything happen when [the vehicle] made that 
turn? 
 
A: When it made that turn, it actually hit the gravel on the right-hand 
side of the road and then it came back onto the roadway. 
 
Q: And when that happened, you say it hit the gravel.  How far off the 
road would that be in an estimation? 
 
A: I would say its full right tire went into the gravel.  
  
Q: So its full right tire went off of the road and in the gravel? 
 
A: That is correct. 
 
(9/28/15 Tr., p.7, L.15 – p.8, L.2.)  Deputy Zalewski was asked on cross-examination, 
“And that was just one tire that went on to the gravel?”  She answered, “Well, it was 
both sides of the passenger side tire.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.8-11.)  This testimony 
could be interpreted to mean either that both sides of Mr. Ambriz’s passenger front tire 
went into the gravel, or that both Mr. Ambriz’s passenger front tire and his passenger 
rear tire went into the gravel.   
Deputy Reusze did not state whether she saw one or both of Mr. Ambriz’s 
passenger side tires drive into the gravel.  She testified that she saw Mr. Ambriz’s 
vehicle “drive off the road into the gravel to the right side.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.16-23.)  
She was not asked to clarify this testimony on either direct or cross-examination. 
In its order denying Mr. Ambriz’s motion to suppress, the district court stated 
“[b]oth deputies testified that they saw the Defendant’s vehicle go off the roadway with 
at least the passenger-side tires in the gravel on the side of the road.”  (R., p.92.)  This 
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is not an accurate characterization of the officers’ testimony.  It would be accurate to 
say that the officers testified they saw Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle go off the roadway with at 
least the front passenger-side tire in the gravel.  This is significant, of course, because 
this is the one portion of the encounter that was not captured on the dash-cam video 
recording, and the portion of the encounter that was captured on the video recording of 
the stop was rather minimal—specifically, the in-lane “jerking motion.”  (See R., p.94; 








The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ambriz’s Motion To Suppress 
 
The officers who stopped Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle testified they did so because first, 
when executing a right turn onto an unlined and unmarked highway, (at least) the right 
front tire of Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle entered the gravel on the side of the road; and second, 
after properly signaling and executing a second right turn approximately one minute 
later, Mr. Ambriz made quick, jerky movements within his lane of travel.  Relying partly 
on State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 1991), Mr. Ambriz argued in his opening 
brief that this driving pattern did not provide the officers with reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity because it could just as easily be explained by conduct falling within the 
broad range of normal driving behavior.  The State attempts to distinguish Emory and 
argues, for the first time on appeal, that Mr. Ambriz’s driving onto the gravel on the side 
of the road (but not his in-lane movements) constituted a traffic violation.  The State’s 
arguments are unavailing and should be rejected by this Court.  The conduct observed 
by the officers did not provide them with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Mr. Ambriz does not contend that Emory created a “normal driving behavior” 
exception to traffic laws.  (See Resp. Br., p.7.)  Instead, he contends that, like in Emory, 
the driving pattern observed by the officers here could just as easily be explained by 
conduct falling within the broad range of normal driving behavior.  See Emory, 119 
Idaho at 662.  The State contends this case is more analogous to State v. Morris, 159 
Idaho 651 (Ct. App. 2015), but Morris is distinguishable.   
In Morris, an officer witnessed the defendant’s vehicle’s tires cross the solid white 
line for two to three seconds, and the district court determined this constituted a 
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violation of either Idaho Code § 49-630 or § 49-637.  159 Idaho at 655.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the denial of Mr. Morris’s motion to suppress, concluding the conduct 
observed by the officer constituted a violation of § 49-637(1).  Id. at 656.  Having 
determined he committed a traffic violation, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument 
under Emory that his driving fell within the normal range of driving behavior.  Id.  The 
Court explained “the patrol officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in that he 
had witnessed Morris commit a traffic violation.”  Id.  
Here, unlike in Morris, the State did not argue in the district court that Mr. Ambriz 
committed a traffic violation, and the district court made no findings with respect to the 
same.  Now, for the first time on appeal, the State argues that Mr. Ambriz committed a 
traffic violation when he “[drove] on the gravel outside the roadway.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  
The State should not be allowed to raise this argument for this first time on appeal and, 
in any event, the record does not establish that Mr. Ambriz committed a traffic violation. 
The State first argues Mr. Ambriz violated Idaho Code § 49-630(1).  (Resp. 
Br., p.9.)  Idaho Code § 49-630(1) states that with certain exceptions not relevant here, 
“[u]pon all highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the 
roadway….”  As an initial matter, the State did prove in the district court that East 16th 
Street, which is a two-lane road without any line or lane markings, is of sufficient width 
to accommodate two vehicles driving fully in the roadway.  (See Def. Ex. A, ATT0015, 
00:00-00:25.)  Moreover, the State did not argue, and the district court did not find, that 
a violation of § 49-630(1) can exist in the absence of any line or lane markings.  In 
State v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 552 (Ct. App. 2000), the defendant argued the officer’s 
observation of him driving over the fog line could not establish reasonable suspicion of a 
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traffic violation because the fog line was obscured by snow.  Id. at 554.  The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument, stating “snow cover on the fog line would not inevitably 
excuse such a violation when the visibility of the line separating traffic lanes permitted 
drivers to ascertain the location of the roadway as the [officer] was able to do.”  Id. at 
554-55.  In this case, there was no line demarcating the road and the gravel and, 
further, no line separating the two traffic lanes.  The State does not cite any cases 
finding a violation of Idaho Code § 49-630(1) on a two-lane highway of unknown width 
that does not have lane or line markings. 
 The State next argues that Mr. Ambriz violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1).  (Resp. 
Br., p.10.)  This statute, titled “[d]riving on highways laned for traffic,” provides for 
certain rules “[w]henever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly 
marked lanes for traffic . . . .”  As discussed above, East 16th Street does not contain 
any lane markings.  (See Def. Ex. A, ATT0015, 00:00-00:25.)  Thus, Mr. Ambriz’s 
driving on East 16th Street could not have violated § 49-637.  
What we are left with, then, is the officers’ observation of Mr. Ambriz driving 
briefly onto the gravel on the right side of East 16th Street, and Mr. Ambriz’s in-lane 
“jerky motions.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.31, Ls.14-18; p.35, Ls.10-14.)   This is the type of driving 
behavior that cannot support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.   
The State contends that in-lane jerking movements can contribute to a finding of 
reasonable suspicion, relying on State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10 (Ct. App. 1994), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 258-60 (2000).  (Resp. 
Br., pp.8-9.)  But Naccarato is distinguishable.  In Naccarato, the officer who stopped 
the defendant’s vehicle testified at the suppression hearing “that he had pursued the 
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vehicle . . . in order to investigate a citizen’s report of a drunk driver.”  Id. at 12.  He 
followed the defendant’s vehicle and observed it “continuously weaving” within its lane, 
traveling fifteen miles under the posted speed limit.  Id.  The Court of Appeals 
considered the totality of the circumstances, and agreed there was “reasonable, 
articulable suspicion for the officer to make an investigative stop.”  Id.   
Considering the totality of the circumstances here, the officers lacked reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity when they stopped Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle.  There had been 
no report of a drunk driver and no obvious violation of the myriad of traffic and 
equipment laws.  The stop of Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his opening brief, 
Mr. Ambriz respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the 
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 6th day of October, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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